The consultant's advice was clear and backed by research: "Every high-performing product marketing function starts with a well-defined charter. Get crystal clear on your responsibilities, boundaries, and success metrics. Document it. Get executive sign-off. This eliminates confusion and prevents conflict."
We were a six-month-old PMM team at a Series B company that had never had product marketing before. Confusion about our role was constant. Sales thought we were their content factory. Product thought we were their launch executors. Marketing thought we should be running demand gen campaigns.
A clear charter made perfect sense.
We spent two months building it. Cross-functional interviews to understand stakeholder expectations. Analysis of where PMM creates the most value. Frameworks borrowed from Pragmatic Institute and Product Marketing Alliance. Iterations with our executive team.
The final document was beautiful. Ten pages. Three core pillars (strategy, enablement, growth). Twelve specific responsibility areas. Clear boundaries defining what PMM owned versus what we supported versus what was explicitly out of scope.
The CMO presented it to the executive team. Everyone nodded. The CEO said "this is great clarity." The VP of Product said "I'm glad we're all aligned now."
We laminated it and hung it in our team room. We referenced it in kickoff meetings. We sent it to new hires.
Three months later, the same document that was supposed to eliminate conflict had become the primary weapon people used to block our work.
The First Time It Got Weaponized
The VP of Sales called a meeting: "We need battle cards updated for the new competitive threat."
This was clearly in our charter. Page 4, responsibility area #6: "Own competitive intelligence program including battle cards, competitive positioning, and sales enablement on competitive differentiation."
We started working on it. Reached out to the competitive intelligence vendor we'd been using. Scheduled interviews with sales reps who'd lost deals. Drafted updated battle cards.
Then we got an email from the VP of Product: "Please pause the competitive battle card work. This falls under Product's responsibility for product strategy and roadmap prioritization, not PMM's responsibility for sales enablement."
I pulled up the charter. Page 7, "Out of Scope for PMM": "Product roadmap decisions and feature prioritization."
We weren't touching roadmap. We were updating battle cards so sales could sell against the competition more effectively.
The VP of Product sent a longer email: "Competitive strategy requires product decisions about which features to build to counter competitive threats. This is product roadmap work. PMM can execute the battle cards after Product defines the strategy."
We forwarded our charter section to him. He forwarded his charter interpretation back to us. The email chain grew to seventeen replies.
The VP of Sales escalated to the CEO: "PMM was chartered to own competitive intelligence. Product is blocking them. I need these battle cards."
The VP of Product escalated to the CEO: "PMM is overstepping into product strategy. Their charter clearly states roadmap is out of scope."
The CEO scheduled a meeting to "clarify charter interpretation."
The battle cards took six weeks instead of one week. Not because the work was complex. Because we spent five weeks arguing about whose responsibility it was.
The Pattern That Kept Repeating
Once the precedent was set—that the charter could be used to block work rather than enable it—the pattern repeated constantly:
Incident 2: Product Launch Ownership
PMM: "We own end-to-end launch planning and execution." (Charter page 3)
Product: "You own GTM execution. We own launch strategy including timing, scope, and priority." (Their interpretation of page 5, "PMM partners with Product on launch strategy")
Result: Three-week delay while we argued about whether "partner" meant "PMM leads with Product input" or "Product leads with PMM execution."
Incident 3: Pricing Research
PMM: "We conduct market research to inform pricing strategy." (Charter page 4)
Finance: "Pricing is a Finance and Product decision. PMM provides input but doesn't conduct independent research." (Their interpretation of page 7, "PMM does not set final pricing")
Result: Our pricing research project got killed because Finance saw it as territorial overreach.
Incident 4: Customer Marketing
PMM: "We develop customer advocacy programs to support sales." (Charter page 6)
Customer Success: "Customer advocacy is a CS responsibility. PMM supports with materials but doesn't run programs." (Their interpretation of page 8, "PMM does not own customer onboarding or retention")
Result: Our customer reference program languished because CS and PMM both thought the other team should lead.
The charter that was supposed to create clarity had created a new form of organizational paralysis. Every project required charter interpretation meetings before we could start actual work.
What We Got Wrong About Charters
The consultant wasn't wrong that high-performing PMM teams have clarity about their role. But we'd confused "clarity about role" with "detailed documented responsibilities."
The problems with our charter:
Problem 1: It tried to draw clear lines in areas with inherent ambiguity
Competitive intelligence is inherently cross-functional. It requires product insights (what we can build), sales insights (what we hear from customers), and market insights (what competitors are doing). Trying to say "PMM owns this" created turf battles.
Better approach: "PMM coordinates competitive intelligence with input from Product and Sales."
Problem 2: It confused activities with outcomes
Our charter listed twelve activities PMM was responsible for (launches, enablement, positioning, etc.). But it didn't clearly define the outcomes we were accountable for.
When the VP of Sales needed battle cards fast, he didn't care whether producing them was "PMM's activity" or "Product's activity." He cared about the outcome: enabling sales to win against the competitor.
By focusing on activity ownership instead of outcome accountability, we'd created conditions for territorial disputes.
Problem 3: It assumed documented agreement would prevent conflict
Getting everyone to nod in a meeting isn't the same as building shared understanding. The VP of Product and I both signed off on the charter, but we'd internalized completely different interpretations.
I thought "PMM owns competitive intelligence" meant we lead competitive analysis and create battle cards.
He thought it meant we create sales enablement materials after Product defines competitive strategy.
Both interpretations were consistent with the charter language. Neither of us realized we disagreed until we tried to execute.
Problem 4: It created a document people could weaponize
Once precedent was set that charter disputes got escalated to the CEO for interpretation, the charter became a political tool.
If you wanted to block another team's initiative, you could claim it violated their charter. Even if you were wrong, the resulting escalation and "clarification meeting" would delay the work by weeks.
The charter had become organizational bureaucracy.
The Company That Did It Right
Six months into charter dysfunction, I talked to a VP of PMM at a similar-stage company. They'd also built a PMM function from scratch.
"Did you write a PMM charter?" I asked.
"We wrote three sentences."
"That's it?"
"That's it."
She sent me their charter:
Product Marketing Mission
We make products easier to sell and customers easier to win.
We do this by:
- Understanding the market better than anyone else in the company
- Translating product value into messages that resonate with buyers
- Enabling every customer-facing team to represent our products effectively
When there's confusion about who owns what, we ask: "Does this help us achieve our mission?" If yes, we do it. If another team can do it better, we support them.
Three sentences. No detailed responsibility matrix. No "in scope" vs. "out of scope" lists.
"How do you handle territorial disputes?" I asked.
"We don't have many. Because we're mission-focused instead of activity-focused."
She gave an example: When competitive intelligence came up, the conversation wasn't "Is this PMM's job or Product's job?" It was "Does PMM understanding the competitive landscape help us make products easier to sell and customers easier to win?"
Obviously yes.
So PMM led it. Product contributed insights about product strategy. Sales contributed insights about objections. But nobody argued about whose "job" it was.
"What if Product wanted to lead competitive intelligence?" I asked.
"Then we'd ask: Can Product do it in a way that makes our products easier to sell? If yes, great—we support them. If no, we discuss the gap and figure out how to fill it."
The difference was stark. Their charter created a North Star. Our charter created a battleground.
What We Changed (And What Actually Worked)
After watching our charter create more problems than it solved, we rewrote it. The new version was two pages instead of ten:
Page 1: PMM Mission and Outcomes
Our mission: Make products successful in market.
We're accountable for three outcomes:
- Revenue: Product marketing initiatives contribute measurably to pipeline and closed revenue
- Effectiveness: Sales, customer success, and other GTM teams are more effective because of PMM's work
- Insight: Product and executive decisions are better informed because of PMM's market understanding
Page 2: How We Work
Core activities: We typically lead positioning, messaging, launches, competitive intelligence, and sales enablement. But "who leads" is less important than "what outcome we achieve."
Collaboration model: When there's ambiguity about ownership, we ask:
- Is PMM best positioned to lead this work?
- Does another team have more expertise or better context?
- What outcome are we optimizing for?
Decision principle: Default to "whoever can drive the best outcome leads, others support."
That was it. Two pages. No detailed responsibility matrices. No "in scope" vs. "out of scope" lists.
The shift was subtle but powerful: from "Here's what PMM owns" to "Here's what PMM is accountable for achieving."
How It Changed the Dynamics
The battle cards situation happened again three months later. New competitor, urgent need for updated materials.
Old charter world: This would have triggered a dispute about whether competitive strategy was Product's territory or PMM's territory. Weeks of escalation.
New charter world: I walked into the VP of Product's office and said: "We need updated battle cards fast. I can lead this work or you can lead it. Which approach gets sales the materials they need faster?"
He said: "You lead. I'll give you 30 minutes this week to explain product strategy against this competitor."
Battle cards shipped in five days.
The difference: We'd optimized for outcome (sales getting effective materials) instead of territory (whose job this was).
The same shift happened across other areas:
Pricing research: Instead of arguing about whether PMM could run pricing research, we asked: "Will pricing research help us sell more effectively?" Yes. "Is PMM best positioned to lead it?" We had research skills Finance didn't have. We led. Finance contributed requirements and constraints.
Customer advocacy: Instead of arguing about whether it was PMM's job or CS's job, we asked: "What outcome do we need?" (Sales needs customer references for deals.) "Who can deliver that outcome?" PMM had relationships with marketing-friendly customers. CS had relationships with operationally-happy customers. We divided responsibility by customer type.
The charter stopped being a boundary document and became an outcome agreement.
The Real Reason PMM Charters Fail
After talking to a dozen PMM leaders about their charter experiences, a pattern emerged:
Successful charters focus on outcomes and create framework for collaboration.
Failed charters focus on activities and create framework for territorial disputes.
The reason most PMM charters fail isn't that they're poorly written. It's that they're solving the wrong problem.
The problem companies think they're solving: "Lack of clarity about what PMM does."
The actual problem: "Lack of agreement about who's accountable for cross-functional outcomes."
Competitive intelligence isn't unclear because we don't know what it involves. It's unclear because it requires product context (what can we build?), sales context (what do customers care about?), and market context (what are competitors doing?).
No clean handoff exists. It's inherently collaborative.
A charter that tries to assign competitive intelligence to one function creates conflict. A charter that says "we're all accountable for competitive intelligence being effective" creates collaboration.
The difference is subtle but critical:
Activity-based charter: "PMM owns competitive intelligence." (Creates dispute when Product wants input on competitive strategy)
Outcome-based charter: "We're accountable for sales being equipped to win against competitors. PMM typically leads, Product contributes roadmap implications, Sales contributes field intelligence." (Creates collaboration because everyone is focused on the outcome)
For PMM teams navigating these cross-functional dynamics while trying to prove their business impact, platforms like Segment8 help track how collaborative initiatives like competitive intelligence actually affect win rates—making outcome-based charters measurable instead of aspirational.
The Charter Test
If you're writing a PMM charter (or revising one that's creating conflict), ask this question for every responsibility you're documenting:
"If another team wanted to lead this work and could do it well, would I fight them for it?"
If yes, you're probably focused on territory instead of outcomes.
If no, your charter should reflect that flexibility: "PMM typically leads X, but we optimize for outcomes over ownership."
The best PMM charters I've seen are short (2-3 pages), outcome-focused ("we're accountable for revenue, effectiveness, and insight"), and collaborative ("when there's ambiguity, we optimize for outcomes").
The worst PMM charters I've seen are long (8-15 pages), activity-focused ("PMM owns these twelve responsibilities"), and territorial ("these areas are explicitly out of scope").
The first type creates alignment. The second type creates lawyers.
What We Should Have Done
If I could go back to the beginning when we were building our PMM charter, I'd do three things differently:
1. Start with outcomes, not activities
Instead of listing activities PMM owns, start with: "What outcomes is PMM accountable for?" Then work backwards to figure out what activities support those outcomes.
2. Build for collaboration, not territory
Instead of clear "in scope" vs. "out of scope" boundaries, create frameworks for how PMM collaborates with other functions when work spans boundaries.
3. Keep it short
A three-page charter that everyone understands is better than a ten-page charter that becomes a reference document in territorial disputes.
The goal isn't to create perfect clarity. The goal is to create enough shared understanding that teams can collaborate effectively when ambiguity arises.
And ambiguity will always arise. Because PMM sits at the intersection of product, marketing, and sales. That intersection is inherently messy.
The question is whether your charter helps you navigate the mess or weaponizes it.
Ours started as a weapon. We had to rewrite it into a compass.
Most companies are still using weapons and wondering why their PMM teams are stuck in escalation meetings instead of doing actual work.
The charter isn't the problem. The belief that documentation can eliminate organizational ambiguity is the problem.
And that's not something you can solve with better writing.
It's something you solve by optimizing for outcomes over territory.
Which, ironically, is exactly what our original ten-page charter said we should do.
We just had to live through the dysfunction to understand what it meant.