Our first LATAM customer signed a $50K annual contract in Brazilian Reais.
Two months later, the Real depreciated 18% against the dollar. Our $50K contract was now worth $41K. We hadn't hedged the currency risk.
Three months after that, the customer asked to renegotiate pricing because "the contract is no longer affordable at the current exchange rate."
We were stuck. Honor the original Real-denominated price and accept a 20% revenue reduction? Insist on USD equivalent and lose the customer?
This wasn't a one-time problem. Over the next six months, we faced currency volatility in Argentina (annual inflation over 100%), payment infrastructure challenges in Mexico (customers couldn't pay via international credit cards), and partnership conflicts in Colombia (our local partner competed against us with our own product knowledge).
LATAM expansion looked straightforward on paper. In practice, it required completely rethinking our pricing, payment systems, and go-to-market approach to account for economic and operational realities we'd never encountered in North America or Europe.
Here's what actually works in LATAM B2B SaaS after learning the expensive way.
The Currency Problem Nobody Warned Us About
In the US and Europe, currency fluctuation is an annoyance. In LATAM, it's existential.
We launched in LATAM with the same pricing strategy we used everywhere else: USD-denominated contracts with local currency payment options.
This broke immediately.
Argentina: Inflation ran 120%+ annually. Customers couldn't budget in pesos for USD-denominated contracts because the exchange rate changed weekly.
Brazil: The Real fluctuated 15-25% annually against the dollar. Customers wanted Real-denominated contracts but we couldn't accept the currency risk.
Mexico: Relatively stable currency, but customers still preferred peso-denominated pricing for budget predictability.
Colombia, Chile, Peru: Each had different currency stability profiles and different customer expectations around pricing.
We tried multiple approaches:
Approach 1: USD-only pricing
We insisted on USD contracts to avoid currency risk. Customers couldn't budget accurately because exchange rates fluctuated. We lost deals.
Approach 2: Local currency pricing without adjustment clauses
We let customers sign contracts in local currencies. We absorbed currency losses when currencies depreciated. Margins evaporated.
Approach 3: Local currency with quarterly price adjustments
We denominated contracts in local currencies but included clauses allowing quarterly repricing based on exchange rates. Customers hated this uncertainty.
Approach 4 (what worked): Segmented currency strategy
Large enterprises: USD-denominated contracts. These companies had treasury operations that could manage currency risk.
Mid-market: Local currency contracts with annual price adjustments tied to inflation/currency indexes. We hedged currency risk through financial instruments.
SMB: Local currency with conservative pricing that assumed 15-20% annual currency depreciation. Built the currency risk into our pricing instead of repricing mid-contract.
This segmented approach required complex financial operations (currency hedging, multiple pricing books, inflation indexing) but let us serve different customer segments profitably.
The lesson: LATAM currency volatility isn't a minor operational detail—it's a core pricing and financial planning challenge that requires sophisticated solutions.
The Payment Infrastructure That Doesn't Exist
We assumed we could accept payments via credit card like we did everywhere else.
In Brazil, our credit card payment success rate was 40%. 60% of transactions failed.
The reasons:
Credit card penetration varies wildly: In Chile and Argentina, business credit cards are common. In Brazil and Mexico, many businesses don't have international credit cards that can process USD payments.
Cross-border payment restrictions: Some LATAM countries restrict international payments or require special approvals for recurring foreign payments.
Local payment preferences: Boleto Bancário in Brazil, SPEI in Mexico, local bank transfers throughout the region. These payment methods don't integrate with standard US payment processors.
Tax documentation requirements: Brazil requires specific tax documentation (CPF/CNPJ numbers) for all transactions. Mexico has similar requirements.
We had to build country-specific payment infrastructure:
Brazil:
- Integrated with local payment processors that support Boleto Bancário
- Built CPF/CNPJ collection into billing flow
- Enabled local bank transfers
- Partnered with local payment companies (PagSeguro, EBANX)
Mexico:
- Integrated SPEI bank transfer system
- Enabled OXXO cash payment (yes, some businesses still pay via cash deposit)
- Added Mexican tax ID (RFC) collection
Argentina:
- Built to handle dual currency accounting (official rate vs. parallel market rate)
- Enabled local transfer systems
- Structured pricing to account for capital controls
Other LATAM countries:
- Country-specific bank transfer integrations
- Local payment processors where needed
This payment infrastructure investment cost $120K in development and added 30% to our payment processing costs in LATAM versus US.
But it was essential. Without local payment methods, we simply couldn't collect payment from most customers.
Why Partner-Led Expansion Worked (and Then Broke)
We couldn't afford to build sales teams in 15 LATAM countries. We built a partner-led expansion strategy:
Find local technology partners in each country who would resell our platform bundled with their implementation services.
This worked brilliantly for 18 months. Then it broke.
What worked initially:
Partners had local market knowledge, existing customer relationships, and in-country presence. They could sell in local markets faster than we could build direct teams.
We grew from 0 to $1.8M LATAM ARR in 18 months through partners.
What broke:
Our top Brazilian partner started building a competitive product using the market knowledge they'd gained selling our platform.
Our Mexican partner demanded exclusivity—they wanted to be our only partner in Mexico, preventing us from working with other Mexican partners or going direct.
Our Colombian partner wasn't investing in sales. They'd signed up as a partner to access our technology but weren't actually selling.
The partner conflict cycle:
- Partner signs up excited to resell our platform
- Partner invests in learning our technology and market positioning
- Partner realizes they could build competing product or demand better terms
- Partner either competes directly or holds their market access hostage for better economics
We restructured our partner strategy:
Tier 1 markets (Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile): We built direct teams after partners reached $500K ARR in their market. Partners transitioned from resellers to implementation-only partners.
Tier 2 markets (Argentina, Peru, Central America): We kept partner-led sales but with non-exclusive agreements allowing us to work with multiple partners per country.
Tier 3 markets (smaller LATAM countries): Pure partner-led with minimal direct involvement.
This hybrid model balanced the speed of partner-led expansion with the control of direct sales in major markets.
Companies navigating complex partner ecosystems in emerging markets can benefit from structured frameworks—platforms like Segment8 offer partner conflict resolution templates and co-selling playbooks designed for markets with developing channel dynamics.
The Language Localization We Got Wrong
Spanish and Portuguese are the dominant languages in LATAM. We thought localization meant translating our product and marketing into these languages.
Wrong.
Problem 1: Spanish isn't monolithic
Mexican Spanish differs from Colombian Spanish differs from Argentine Spanish. Vocabulary, idioms, and business terminology vary.
We translated everything into "neutral Spanish" and got feedback that it felt "foreign" or "not written for us" from customers in different countries.
We had to create market-specific Spanish:
- Mexican Spanish for Mexico and Central America
- South American Spanish for Colombia, Chile, Peru, etc.
- Argentine Spanish for Argentina (pronunciation and vocabulary differ significantly)
Problem 2: Brazilian Portuguese isn't European Portuguese
We initially translated Portuguese materials using European Portuguese translators. Brazilian customers found it awkward and overly formal.
We rebuilt with Brazilian Portuguese and saw engagement rates improve 35%.
Problem 3: English is still preferred for some segments
Surprisingly, many LATAM enterprise buyers preferred English-language materials. Using English signaled "international quality" and "enterprise-grade technology."
We ended up with segmented language strategy:
- Enterprise buyers: English or bilingual materials
- Mid-market: Local Spanish/Portuguese primary with English secondary
- SMB: Local language only
This required maintaining 4-5 different language versions of all materials instead of the 2 (Spanish + Portuguese) we'd initially planned.
The Sales Cycle Reality in LATAM Markets
We assumed LATAM sales cycles would resemble US cycles: 2-4 months for mid-market, 4-6 months for enterprise.
Actual LATAM cycles:
Brazil enterprise: 8-12 months (extensive legal review, committee-based decision making, bureaucratic procurement)
Mexico mid-market: 3-5 months (similar to US but with added legal complexity)
Argentina: Completely unpredictable. Economic uncertainty meant decisions would stall for months waiting for "economic stability" that never came.
Colombia, Chile: 4-6 months (more process-driven than US)
The reasons for longer cycles:
More risk-averse buyers: LATAM companies have lived through multiple economic crises. They evaluate vendors more cautiously because switching costs are higher when budgets are tight.
Complex legal requirements: LATAM countries have more stringent contract requirements, data localization laws, and tax compliance documentation than US.
Committee-based decisions: LATAM companies tend toward consensus-based decision making with more stakeholders than US companies.
Currency/economic uncertainty: Buyers delay decisions during economic volatility, waiting for "better" conditions to commit to multi-year contracts.
We restructured our sales forecasting:
- Extended forecast timelines by 50-100% versus US equivalents
- Treated Argentina as "opportunistic" revenue (impossible to forecast accurately)
- Built pipeline coverage of 6-8x in LATAM versus 3-4x in US to account for longer cycles and higher fallout
What Worked: The Brazil-First Strategy
LATAM isn't one market—it's 20+ countries with different economic conditions, languages, and business cultures.
We tried to launch simultaneously across major LATAM markets. We spread ourselves too thin and failed everywhere.
Then we focused exclusively on Brazil for 12 months.
Why Brazil:
- Largest LATAM economy
- Sophisticated B2B software market
- English proficiency in business community
- Concentrated in São Paulo (easier to serve one metro than multiple)
- Once you succeed in Brazil, you have credibility for rest of LATAM
The Brazil-first approach:
Months 1-6: Built Brazilian entity, hired Brazilian team, integrated local payment systems, developed Brazilian Portuguese materials, signed 5 Brazilian customers.
Months 6-12: Grew Brazilian customer base to 25 customers, developed Brazilian case studies, refined pricing for Brazilian market.
Months 12-18: Used Brazilian success to enter Mexico and Colombia. "We have 25 Brazilian customers" was compelling proof for Mexican/Colombian buyers.
Months 18-24: Expanded to Chile, Argentina, Peru using Brazilian playbook with country-specific adaptations.
This sequential strategy let us learn LATAM market dynamics in one market before expanding broadly.
The Enterprise vs SMB Economics Problem
In the US and Europe, SMB customers are often profitable even at lower contract values because CAC is low (product-led growth, self-service, minimal sales touch).
In LATAM, SMB economics didn't work:
SMB challenges:
- Couldn't pay via credit card (required local payment integration)
- Needed local language support
- Required sales-assisted purchase (not self-service)
- Had higher churn due to economic volatility
- Low contract values ($500-$2K annually) didn't cover service costs
Enterprise economics were better:
- Large enough contracts ($50K-$200K) to justify sales and service costs
- Could pay in USD reducing currency risk
- Lower churn (more stable companies)
- Willing to pay for implementation services and training
We restructured our LATAM strategy to focus almost exclusively on enterprise and upper mid-market:
Minimum contract size: $15K annually (versus $3K minimum in US) Target customer profile: 250+ employees, $50M+ revenue Sales model: High-touch, consultative (no self-service)
This meant walking away from 70% of inbound LATAM leads that didn't meet our qualification criteria. It was painful, but the economics required it.
The Data Residency Requirements We Didn't Expect
Several LATAM countries have data localization requirements we weren't prepared for:
Brazil: LGPD (Brazilian GDPR) requires customer data to be stored in Brazil or have explicit consent for international transfer.
Argentina: Data protection laws require local storage for certain data types.
Colombia: Emerging data residency requirements for financial services data.
We'd built our infrastructure assuming we could serve all LATAM from US data centers with CDN caching.
We had to:
Build Brazilian data center infrastructure: Partnered with local cloud providers to host Brazilian customer data in Brazil.
Implement data residency controls: Let customers choose data storage location (Brazil, US, or other).
Add compliance documentation: DPAs, data processing agreements, and legal documentation for LATAM data protection laws.
This infrastructure investment cost $200K and added operational complexity, but it was required to serve enterprise customers in regulated industries.
The Uncomfortable Truth About LATAM Expansion
LATAM has 650 million people and rapidly growing digital economy. It also has complexity that makes it one of the hardest regions for B2B SaaS expansion.
Our LATAM CAC was 2.5x our US CAC. Our average contract value was 70% of US ACV. Our payment processing costs were 3x higher.
The math barely worked, and only because we:
- Focused on enterprise/upper mid-market only
- Built sophisticated currency and payment infrastructure
- Accepted longer sales cycles and lower margins
- Invested in deep country-specific localization
What doesn't work in LATAM:
- USD-only pricing without currency risk management
- Standard credit card payment infrastructure
- Pure partner-led expansion without direct control in major markets
- Single Spanish/Portuguese translation (need country-specific)
- Expecting US sales cycle timelines
- SMB economics (rarely work profitably)
What works:
- Segmented currency strategy by customer size
- Country-specific payment infrastructure
- Hybrid partner/direct model (partners for reach, direct for control)
- Market-specific language localization
- Extended sales cycles and conservative forecasting
- Enterprise focus with higher contract minimums
- Brazil-first sequential expansion strategy
- Data residency compliance and local infrastructure
LATAM is worth the investment if you're willing to accept that it will require more operational complexity, longer path to profitability, and lower margins than other regions.
The companies succeeding in LATAM are the ones willing to build LATAM-specific operations instead of trying to serve the region as an extension of US or European infrastructure.
We're three years into LATAM and it's our most challenging region operationally. It's also our fastest-growing region with enormous future potential if we continue investing properly in localization and infrastructure.
The question isn't whether LATAM is hard—it is. The question is whether the long-term market opportunity justifies the short-term investment and complexity.
For us, the answer is yes. But it required completely rebuilding our assumptions about pricing, payments, partnerships, and economics for LATAM market realities.